How were battles of the late 18th and early l9th centuries fought? Much differently, of course, than those today. Unlike the 20th Century, where change is the norm, the weapons used during the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars were essentially those developed and used since the late 17th Century. The three basic building blocks of an army were the infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Each had its place and mission on a battlefield, and each had weapons peculiar to its branch which defined its mission.
The Infantry: Infantry was the "Queen of Battles'', and the smoothbore flintlock musket with a socket bayonet made it so. Indeed, save for the introduction of the iron ramrod in the 1740s, muskets changed little throughout the 18th Century. All muskets were, more or less, the same simple hollow tube with a touch hole for the spark from the flint to ignite the powder in the chamber. Muskets threw a lead ball weighing approximately one ounce out to a range of up to 1,000 yards, but accuracy at much over 100 yards was problematical, and volleys were generally not delivered at much over 150 yards. A small percentage of infantrymen carried the far more accurate rifles, but their slow loading time and lack of an effective bayonet made them ineffective except for skirmishing. Due to their use of black powder, all firearms of the period produced a thick white smoke, which, if there was no breeze, could obscure a battlefield. With proper care in loading, muskets were more or less reliable; although misfires were common, they were usually
easy to correct. It was, however, impossible to deliver effective fire in a steady rain as the flints could not be long kept dry. For infantry,
this could prove especially dangerous when unsupported in the face of cavalry.
Until the French Revolution, the mostly professional European armies maneuvered their infantry in line formations, advancing upon each other, in step, with a ponderous, classical ease. Fire was withheld until within 100 or so yards. At that point, units traded murderous volleys. Being in line formation allowed the maximum number of soldiers to fire. As the range closed and casualties mounted, one side or the other norrnally withdrew, often disordered or routed. Close range volley fire delivered by well-ordered professionals in line formations could blow an enemy unit away in a matter of seconds. The bayonet, that fabled seldom got close enough for hand-to-hand combat. Since the range and accuracy of the muskets was so poor, it was necessary to keep the
infantrymen tightly controlled and formed, a difficult task when in line formation. Closely watched by a highly-disciplined cadre, the masses of infantry maneuvered slowly about the battlefield, placing fire on the enemy and taking and holding ground.
|
Along with the French Revolution came a revolution in the French army. The military revolution was one of necessity. With mass conscription and a citizen army, came a force fired with enthusiasm, but lacking training and professionalism. Lacking the training to maneuver in line formations, the French armies moved in deeper column formations where exact alignment was both less important and easier to maintain. Theoretically, the infantrymen were to change into line formation when close to the enemy. Depending on the training of the troops, this often got translated on the battlefield into a force that both maneuvered and fought in column.
Because column formations allowed fewer soldiers to fire than line formations, the columns were vulnerable to volley fire delivered by steady enemy lines. The French solution was to use light infantry to screen the columns. These troops, usually ten to twenty percent of the total, would fight in an open skirmish order ahead of the columns. The skirmishers, spread out and taking advantage of all available cover, could engage enemy infantry lines without suffering unacceptable casualties while the columns maneuvered or deployed behind them. If the columns did not form or were incapable of forming lines, they could still attack an enemy line with proper preparation. At this point, it was a matter of how ordered an enemy line remained after being enemy lines remained ordered, attack columns would likely fail before their close range volleys. If the enemy lines were disordered, the columns had a chance to close, cheering and brandishing their bayonets, causing a failure in the enemy's morale, or, on rare occasions, a melee.
A third common formation used by infantry was the square. This was a purely defensive formation used to fend off cavalry. The square formation was usually a hollow square, rectangle, or triangle of doubled lines (four to six ranks deep) with bayonets pointed out for all-around defense. Such a formation could with relative safety deliver volleys against attacking cavalry with little fear of the horses riding them down. In fact, squared infantry normally fired only when cavalry directly threatened. Many actions of infantry squares versus cavalry disintegrated into infantry threatening to fire and cavalry threatening to charge, with few casualties on either side.
There are times when squares are not the solution, especially when it rained and much of the threat of defensive musket fire was negated. At this point a square had better be protected by artillery and cavalry or it would be at the mercy of the enemy. At the battles of Dresden and Katzbach, both fought on the same rainy day within 100 miles of each other, unsupported infantry squares were ridden down by cavalry, mowed down by artillery, or, more sensibly, surrendered when their fate became inevitable. At Dresden, in a pouring rain after driving the Austrian cavalry from the field, French horse artillery either blasted or forced the surrender of numerous Austrian squares. At Katzbach, a French army forced a crossing of a swollen stream and advanced unsupported up a steep slope to a plateau, where, due to the weather conditions, the French artillery and cavalry could not easily follow. This left the infantry unsupported, and they were eventually badly defeated.
|
