While ancient Moscow burned unguarded, and the Guards of Mortier and Lefebvre, and the cavalry of Murat and Davout committed excesses in the streets, the Russian army was making its famous march-maneuver. On the second day after leaving Moscow, the Russian troops marched 30 kilometres along the Ryazan road, crossed the Moscow river at the Borovsky ferry and were then suddenly turned to the West by Kutuzov. On September 18th., the army forced marched to the Tula road and was concentrated near the town of Podolsk. In three more days it was on the Kaluga road and camped near Krasnaya Pakhra , where they stayed for five days. Then they again marched along the Kaluga road and on October 2nd., crossed the Nara river and stopped at Tarutino.
This maneuver of the main Russian forces was covered, as usual, by the strong rear-guard that had not only the task of protecting the regular movements of the main units, but also they were to confuse the French. Because of this, some of the rear-guard units moved in different directions. On September,16 Kutuzov ordered rear-guard commander General Miloradovich, to send out some cossacks to make a false movement along the Ryazan road. The rear-guard troops did this successfully, and they could see which way the French were moving and their strength.
Napoleon sent mobile detachments to determine the general direction of the Russian movement, but they were unsuccessful. Murat reported from the Ryazan road, Poniatowsky from the Tula road, and Bessieres from the Kaluga road. They all reported "No Russians". It seemed the Russian army had disappeared without a trace - in broad daylight. For a two week period, until September26th, Napoleon did not know where the Russian army was. Perhaps there are no other examples in military history, where an army of 100 thousand men "disappeared" within sight of the enemy.
By this maneuver the Russians not only saved Kaluga where big army reserves were concentrated, but also the city of Tula with one of the biggest Russia arms factories.
As a result of the Russian army coming to Tarutino, they could maintain connections with Southern Russia that provided the army with new soldiers, arms and all kinds of supplies. This also made possible communications between the main forces and the armies of Tormasov and Chichagov.
The principle strategic importance of this Russian march-maneuver was that it provided ample opportunities to assume the offensive by the army and partisan detachments, not only against the main Napoleonic forces concentrated in Moscow, but against all the French communication lines from Moscow to Smolensk, the most important artery connecting Napoleon and his army with their far rear units and even Paris.
Besides, this maneuver put the army of Napoleon in a very difficult situation. The French were cut off from the paths to the Southern regions of Russia, not ravaged by the war, where it would be able to find necessary food and forage. Also, Napoleon's army found itself in a ring formed by the Russian army and partisan detachments, the French lost the ability to manoeuvre freely. They could not move towards St.Petersburg.
