23. The Battle At Tarutino Near The Chernishnya River October, 18 (October,6), 1812 (Zhilin "The Patriotic War Of 1812", Moscow,1988; Beskrovny L.G. "Russian Military Art Of XIX Century", Moscow,1974; E.V.Tarle, Complete Works, Volume VII., Moscow 1959)

General Leonty Bennigsen A month had passed since Napoleon's army had entered Moscow, and their situation was becoming worse every day. Something had to be done. Would they have to stay in Moscow for the winter? It was dangerous. If only it would be possible to provide for the army some way, but to hold Moscow and keep communications with Paris was impossible. To go to the North - to St.Petersburg? No, it was too far. To leave Moscow and go to Smolensk by the old path - that was to admit the defeat of this campaign, but it was the only to survive; to go Smolensk by the Southern path, through Kaluga, pretending to be on the offensive against the Russian army, and using the regions that had not yet suffered from the war for provisions. Napoleon clearly understood that the situation was very serious, and he had to make the very important decision: should he try to hold out in Moscow or not? The Russian army was still on the defensive and avoided contact with the main French forces. Only the Napoleonic army vanguard of 26 thousand men under the command of Marshal Murat acted against the Russian vanguard. Murat's troops took positions on both banks of the Chernishnya river from where it flowed into the Nara river to the villages Teterinka and Dmitrovskoe. Their right flank was protected by the steep banks of the rivers, and the left flank was on an open plain. They did not occupy the forest next to the left flank. The Chernishnya river was shallow, it was possible to ford it in many places, so it was not a serious barrier. The French troops were 6 kilometers from the Russian army. Taking into account the relative weakness of the French vanguard, the distance between it and the carelessness of Napoleon's main forces, Kutuzov decided to strike the first blow by the larger and growing forces of his army. The reports he received from Dorokhov, Seslavin and from the Russian vanguard, under the command of Miloradovich, plus evidence from captives during October, 13 - 14, confirmed that Napoleon, with his general forces, was still in Moscow, and the only French troops to be concerned was the vanguard of Murat. All was fairly quiet during the first half of October. Before the 16th., the Headquarters of Kutuzov received no alarming news. But the reports said the enemy had crossed the Nara River near the villages Kamenskoe and Romanovo. It was also reported that strong French forces with artillery were moving along the Big Moscow road from Smolensk, and the movements of large French forces from the Old to the New Kaluga road were observed. So the situation in the middle of October was quickly changing. Both sides became more active; each having their own reason. Kutuzov saw the increased power of the Russian army and began military actions again, Napoleon; looking for a way out of the blind alley in which his army found itself. On the evening of October 17th., the Russian army set out in five columns from Tarutino. Their flank consisted of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Infantry Corps, 10 Cossack regiments and the 2nd jager regiment. They crossed the Nara river, passed through the forest and at daybreak took positions in front of the French left flank. The grouping of the Russian troops under the command of General Bennigsen was entrusted with the main mission of defeating the enemy vanguard. The Battle at Tarutino (from the picture by Hess) General Karl Baghowut It was quiet in the French camp as the Russian troops moved to the edge of the forest and prepared to attack. On the right flank, near the village of Stromilovo, the Cossack regiments of Orlov-Denisov, the 20th Guards regiment and a battery of horse artillery were concentrated. They were the first to attack, utterly surprising the enemy and cutting off the French path of retreat to the village Spas-Kuplia. The 2nd Infantry Corps of K.F.Baggowut was located to the left, in front of the village Teterinki. Next to it, the troops of the 3rd Infantry Corps of P.A.Stroganov took the initial positions; the 4th Infantry Corps of A.I.Osterman-Tolstoy was on the left flank and was used to connect with the main Russian forces. At 7 a.m. the Cossack regiments of Orlov-Denisov attacked. They rushed the enemy cuirassiers and carabineers who were still sleeping. Taken completely by surprise, French soldiers and officers rushed about frantically. At the same time, the Russian infantry of Baggowut charged out from the forest and, supported by artillery fire, rushed to Teterinki village. But the French were able to recover and met the two regiments of Russian foot jagers with mortal fire. Corps commander General Baghowut who commanded the jagers was killed by one of the first shots. This confused the attacking ranks of Russian troops in the 4th and 48th regiments. They became scattered, but continued to move forward in a thick line. Heated fighting developed behind Teterinki village. Murat had quickly organized strong resistance. Bennigsen brought up additional forces, and the 17th and 4th Divisions from the 2nd Infantry Corps approached. Meanwhile, General Konovnitsyn began to organize the moving of the 4th Infantry Corps to the aid of the Russian troopsattacking Teterinki village. Soon 46 Russian battalions were in the area. The Cossack regiments of Orlov-Denisov attacked the rear of the enemy, crossed the Chernishnya river and began fighting the French cavalry of Latour-Mobourg. The situation of Murat's troops became critical: they could be surrounded on all sides. Understanding this, he began withdrawing his men in roundabout ways through the forest and ravines from the villages Vinkovo and Teterinki to Spas-Kuplia and Voronovo. It was an orderly retreat, firing back at the pursuingsoldiers of Orlov-Denisov. Bennigsen felt he had not enough forces to attack the French successfully, and asked Kutuzov for reinforcements. The Field-Marshal refused this and all the similar requests of Ermolov, Konovnitsyn and Miloradovich. The main Russian forces followed the retreating French troops as far as the Chernishnya river. The 2nd and the 4th Infantry Corps and part of the 2nd Cavalry Corps then advanced to Bogorodskoe village, and the Cossacks of Orlov-Denisov pursued the enemy to Spas-Kuplia. The battle ended by evening and the Russian army returned to Tarutino. The Russians were the winners: they had forced Murat to retreat and had captured 36 artillery guns, 50 charge boxes and a banner. But the French troops of Clapared and Latour-Mobourg had managed to resist Platov's efforts to cut off Murat's path of retreat to Spas-Kuplia village. Bennigsen said afterwards he was sure that if Kutuzov had not capreciously refused to give them timely reinforcements, Murat's troops would have been crushed. Kutuzov had not only refused to send reinforcements, he had even ordered the Russains to retreat from the Chernishya river and return to their Tarutino positions. The Russian troops had struck a telling blow against the enemy vanguard. The French had lost 2500 men killed and wounded and a thousand men captured. The Russians also captured 36 guns and almost all transports. The Russian losses were about 300 killed and 904 wounded. (1) That night there was excitement in the Russian camp at Tarutino. This victory stiffened the spirit of the Russians aspiring to banish the Napoleonic army from the Russia. Perhaps only Bennigsen was displeased with the results of this battle. He was sure Kutuzov had deprived him of the glory of winning by not allowing him to further pursue Mutat's vanguard, and he took full credit for the success of the battle. That evening Napoleon got word of the flight of his cavalry. This was bad news because now there was no possibility of a hidden manoeuvre to Kaluga. Further, such a movement would endanger the French troops because Kutuzov could attack their flank. The battle of October 18th. was, for some strange reason, named "the battle at Tarutino", though it took place a considerable distance from Tarutino village. It gained little military advantage, but it gave the Russians important political and morale benefits, and it greatly boosted the moral of the Russian army: it was their first offensive battle in the campaign, and they had been victorious. Politically, it was the final, decisive push to Napoleon's decision to finally leave Moscow. The Central State Military Historical Archive, Doc.41048, pages 50-51